

World POLITICS

SECOND EDITION

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transfer that took place without armed conflict between the two. A number of explanations can be advanced as to why this unusual event occurred.

First of all, the United States did not seek world leadership. In fact, she was reluctant to accept it even after her power had grown to such a point that her dominant position was obvious to everyone. This made her rise to power much less offensive and much less obvious until after it was an accomplished fact.

Second, America's rapid growth in power was due almost entirely to internal developments that did not threaten England. Her territorial expansion was made at the expense of the American Indians and Mexico. Her imperialistic ventures were made at the expense of Spain, not England, and even they were few and hesitating. Her population growth was brought about by favorable conditions within the country and by free immigration which was as welcome in Europe as it was in the United States. Even American industrial development was profitable to England, for there was a great deal of English capital invested in American industry in the years before the two great wars. Thus America's growth in power before World War I was in no way detrimental to English interests. It did not challenge and defeat her; it merely passed her. Even today, when the supremacy of the United States is established and the power of Britain is visibly shrinking, the United States does not take markets or bases or territory or influence away from Britain. At most, we pick up what she lets go. There is a world of difference between the two. Britain has lost her possessions and her wealth because she is getting weaker, not because of the United States.

The major reason why England has allowed the United States to take her place without a struggle is because the United States has accepted the Anglo-French international order. It has not upset the working rules. It has not substituted new economic or political institutions or even a new ideology. It has not required internal revolutions in any of the old major powers, and those who benefited from the order when England ran it continue to benefit from it today, though to a lesser extent. Far from destroying the Anglo-French international order, the United States has given it a new lease on life by continuing to defend it after England and France alone no longer possessed the power to do so.

In practice, partnership with America has meant that America became the senior partner, a development which was not altogether welcome to England but which was accepted as unavoidable. There is bitterness today over the fact that America does not always exercise her leadership in the way that England would have her exercise it, but even this is viewed as distinctly preferable to accepting a rival international order dominated by any other nation. English acceptance of American

domination has been made easier by the fact that the two nations have been staunch friends for many years, that they have fought two world wars together, and that they are tied to each other not only by economic and political ties, but also by language, culture, and a common history.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that even if England had objected to America's growing power, there was little she could have done about it. Until World War I, the United States was not a European power and took no part in European politics. Her growth was not fully appreciated until it was too late to stop it. When it became apparent that the United States was going to supplant England as the dominant power in the world, England was busy fighting Germany's first challenge, and the United States was her best ally. By the time World War I was over, America's top position in the world was assured, although another war was necessary before the United States accepted fully the responsibilities that went with her position.

To date, this has been the only instance of a challenger replacing a dominant nation without a fight. No one knows whether a similar shift in power within the Communist order (from the Soviet Union to China) is possible. In the 1950s, with Russia a heavy contributor to Chinese industrialization and with close ideological ties between the two countries, it seemed possible that the Anglo-American experience could be repeated. This seemed particularly likely because it appeared that the USSR would be preoccupied in competing with the West at the very time when China would be catching up with her in power. Since the end of the 1950s, however, relations between the two Communist countries have become very strained, largely as a result of China's open challenge to Soviet leadership. This premature declaration of Chinese aspirations so far in advance of the time when they can be realized has diminished the chances of a peaceful change within the Communist camp. On balance, it appears that China's overtaking of Russia will be full of difficulties. It would be rash, however, to predict that Russo-Chinese relations are heading inevitably toward armed conflict. One should wait and see whether Chinese defeats in foreign policy and a change in Chinese leadership will not convince the Communist newcomer that revolutionary fervor is no substitute for industrial strength.

The Conditions of Peace

We are now in position to understand more clearly why the usual distribution of power in the world has not been a balance but rather a preponderance of power in the hands of one nation and its allies. And we can

understand why world peace has coincided with periods of unchallenged supremacy of power, whereas the periods of approximate balance have been the periods of war. Wars occur when a great power in a secondary position challenges the top nation and its allies for control. Thus the usual major conflict is between the top nation (and its allies) and the challenger about to catch up with it in power.

In some respects the international order has striking similarities with that of a national society; it is legitimized by an ideology and rooted in the power differential of the groups that compose it. Peace is possible only when those possessing preponderant power are in firm control and are satisfied with the status quo or with the way in which it promises to develop in a peaceful context. Peace is threatened whenever a powerful nation is dissatisfied with the status quo and is powerful enough to attempt to change things in the face of opposition from those who control the existing international order.

Degree of power and degree of satisfaction, then, become important national characteristics to be considered when trying to locate the nations that are most likely to disturb world peace. We can classify all the nations of the world in terms of these two characteristics, achieving four categories which turn out to be of major importance in international politics:

1. The powerful and satisfied
2. The powerful and dissatisfied
3. The weak and satisfied
4. The weak and dissatisfied

THE POWERFUL AND SATISFIED

The international order is best visualized if one thinks of a pyramid with one nation at the top and many nations at the bottom. Those at the top of the pyramid are most powerful and those at the bottom least powerful. As we move downward in terms of power, the number of nations in each layer is greater than the number in the layer above it. Figure 1 gives a first approximation of the pyramid.

At the very apex of the pyramid is the most powerful nation in the world, currently the United States, previously England, perhaps tomorrow Russia or China. This is the dominant nation, the nation that controls the existing dominant international order. Indeed, this is the nation that established that international order in the first place (or inherited it from its founders), and this is the nation that receives the greatest share of the benefits that flow from the existence of the international order.

The kind of relationship between the dominant nation and the lesser



FIGURE 1

members of its international order varies from one order to another. It varies also according to the power of the lesser member. Thus the United States has a different kind of relationship with the nations of Western Europe than the Soviet Union has with the nations of Eastern Europe, and the United States benefits differently in its relations with Saudi Arabia than it does in its relations with England. All dominant nations attempt to appear disinterested in any benefits for themselves, but in fact the dominant nation always benefits disproportionately from any enterprises involving less powerful nations, be they friends or foes.

It is important to note that the power discrepancy between the dominant nation and the nations below it is usually great. The international order, like any other order, is based on power. A large power discrepancy between the dominant nation and the rest of the nations below it ensures the security of the leader and the stability of the order as a whole.

Just below the apex of the pyramid are the great powers. The difference between them and the dominant nation is to be found not only in their different abilities to influence the behavior of others, but also in the differential benefits they receive from the international order to which they belong. Great powers are, as their name indicates, very powerful nations, but they are less powerful than the dominant nation. They receive substantial benefits from the international order of which they are members, but they receive less benefits than the dominant nation. Because these nations are so important, the dominant nation requires the help of at least some of them to keep its international order running smoothly. Thus we find that some of the great powers are allied with the dominant nation, sharing in the leadership of the dominant international order and in the benefits that flow from it.

Together, the dominant nation and the great powers allied with it make up our first group of nations: the powerful and the satisfied. At present, this group includes the United States, Britain, France, and, since their defeat in World War II, West Germany and Japan. Satisfaction is, of course, a relative term, but in a general way it can be said that these nations are satisfied with the present international order and its working rules, for they feel that the present order offers them the best chance of obtaining the goals they have in mind. The dominant nation is necessarily more satisfied with the existing international order than with any other since it is to a large extent *its* international order. Other nations (such as England and France today) may be satisfied because they realized their full power potential before the present order was established, and thus their power assured them a full measure of what they regard as their rightful share of benefits. Still other great powers (such as the defeated Axis nations) may be considered satisfied because they can no longer hope to achieve the domination they once sought and are thus content to accept a place in the international order that seems likely to allow them substantial rewards.

THE POWERFUL AND DISSATISFIED

Some of the great powers, however, are not satisfied with the way things are run on the international scene, and they make up our second category, that of the powerful and dissatisfied. From this group come the challengers who seek to upset the existing international order and establish a new order in its place. When nations are dissatisfied and at the same time powerful enough to possess the means of doing something about their dissatisfaction, trouble can be expected.

As we have seen in our brief historical sketch, the powerful and dissatisfied nations are usually those that have grown to full power after the existing international order was fully established and the benefits already allocated. These parvenus had no share in the creation of the international order, and the dominant nation and its supporters are not usually willing to grant the newcomers more than a small part of the advantages they receive. Certainly they are unwilling to share the source of all their privileges: the rule of international society. To do so would be to abandon to a newcomer the preferred position they hold. As far as the dominant nation is concerned and, even more pointedly, as far as great nations that support the dominant nation are concerned, the challengers are to be kept in their place.

The challengers, for their part, are seeking to establish a new place for themselves in international society, a place to which they feel their increasing power entitles them. Often these nations have grown rapidly in

power and expect to continue to grow. They have reason to believe that they can rival or surpass in power the dominant nation, and they are unwilling to accept a subordinate position in international affairs when dominance would give them much greater benefits and privileges.

A rapid rise in power thus produces dissatisfaction in itself. At the same time, it is likely to be accompanied by dissatisfaction of a different sort. In the present period such rapid rises have been brought about largely through industrialization. Rapid industrialization, however, produces many internal strains and grievances, and the temptation is great for the national government of a nation undergoing such changes to channel some of the dissatisfaction into aggressive attitudes and actions toward some outside nation in order to divert criticism from the government or other powerful groups within the nation. Industrialization is the source of much of the international trouble of the present period, for it expands the aspirations of men and helps to make them dissatisfied with their lot, while at the same time it increases their power to do something about their dissatisfactions, that is, to wrest a greater share of the good things of life from those who currently control them.

The role of challenger, of course, is not a permanent role, nor is it one that all great powers go through. Some of the great powers never fill it. These are the nations that accept a supporting role in the dominant international order, nations we have classified as "powerful and satisfied." Dissatisfied, powerful nations, however, are likely to become challengers, at least for a time. Those who succeed become dominant (and so satisfied) nations eventually. Those who fail conclusively may fall back and accept a secondary supporting role in the international order they have tried to overturn, as Germany appears to have done after two defeats, thus joining the ranks of the satisfied and the powerful by a different path. As long as they remain outside the dominant international order and have hopes of overturning it or taking over its leadership through combat, however, such nations are serious threats to world peace. It is the powerful and dissatisfied nations that start world wars.

THE WEAK AND SATISFIED

Below the great powers come the lesser nations, middle powers and small powers. Many of these nations have accepted the existing international order (or have had it imposed upon them and now accept it without question) and found a place in it that assures them certain benefits. We shall call them the weak and satisfied.

At the top of this group are the nations generally called second-rank powers, such as Canada, Australia, and Argentina today. Also in this classification are small but wealthy nations such as Belgium, Norway, and

Switzerland. Finally, the category includes those virtually powerless nations and dependencies that are tied to the existing international order and that accept it without question—for example, South Korea, Jamaica, and Liberia.

No trouble is to be expected from nations in this group, because they fill both the requirements of perfectly peaceful nations: (1) On the whole they are satisfied with the status quo; and (2) if they did desire to make changes upsetting others, they would lack the power to do so. The nations in this group do not benefit excessively from the existing international order, but they do have an established place in it that allows them certain benefits. Even if the benefits are not great, at least in the existing international order these nations know where they stand, whereas they have no guarantee that in a new scheme of things they might not be much worse off than they are. Because they are committed to the existing international order, these nations, too, will oppose a challenger.

THE WEAK AND DISSATISFIED

Our fourth and final category consists of those nations and dependencies that are profoundly dissatisfied with the current world order and their place in it but that lack the power to disturb world peace. Indonesia is an example of this type, as are many of the nations of Asia and Africa today.

Such nations may go along with the status quo, resenting the current international order, feeling that their share of its benefits is too small, but nevertheless accepting it. If they are dependencies, they may be forced to help defend the existing order from attack, but such help is usually given half-heartedly. Or these nations may attempt to establish an independent position, not identified with the dominant nation and its allies and not identified with the challengers. In fact, such a position usually has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, for a neutral stand in an uneven battle gives the victory to the stronger side. Nations in this category are not necessarily peaceful. Indeed, they may stir up quite a ruckus in their own corner of the world in the form of a revolt against colonial domination or an attack on a weaker neighbor, but they are not the major disturbers of world peace. They do not possess the power to overturn the international order by themselves: they are dangerous only collectively, if they join the side of a major challenger.

This category includes a disproportionate number of nations at the very bottom of the international pyramid, in particular nonindustrial nations and dependencies. Lacking power, these nations are most often exploited by stronger nations, and consequently they have the most obvious reasons for being dissatisfied with the existing international order. Indeed,

many of the benefits that make this order so attractive to the dominant nation and its supporters exist *at the expense of* the nations on the bottom of the pyramid. They are indeed part of the existing international order: they provide the spoils.

POWER AND SATISFACTION

It should be clear from our classification that power and satisfaction do not go hand in hand, although they are related. The most powerful nation in the world, the dominant nation, is always "satisfied" in the sense of favoring the status quo, since it has already used its power to establish a world order to its satisfaction.

Other great powers may be either satisfied supporters of the dominant international order or dissatisfied challengers seeking to set up a rival order. It is usual at any given moment for most of the great powers to be on the side of the dominant nation, for if a great majority of them were to oppose that nation, its order could not survive for long.

Middle powers are also most likely to be found on the "satisfied" team of the dominant nation, for again their support is important, though some of the middle powers who have risen to that status recently may find that their interests are better served by siding with the challenger.

Small powers, backward nations, and dependencies, on the other hand, are most often "dissatisfied," for reasons we have discussed above. They may be compelled to act in support of the dominant nation and its allies, but their sympathies are often with the challenger.

If we superimpose the satisfaction-dissatisfaction distinction upon the power pyramid, we get the result shown in Figure 2. Figure 2, however, distorts the picture as far as the distribution of power is concerned, for



FIGURE 2

the dominant nation at the top is much stronger than all the bottom nations put together, although the area it represents in a pyramid is smaller. If power is represented by area as well as height, we get the result presented in Figure 3.



FIGURE 3

In a major international contest, the dominant nation is assured the support of the satisfied and of whatever dissatisfied nations it can compel to aid it. The challenger draws his support from the ranks of the dissatisfied, although he rarely can count upon them all. Peace, then, is most likely to be maintained when the powerful and satisfied nations together with their allies enjoy a huge preponderance in power over the challenger and its allies, that is, when the power of those who support the status quo is so great that no military challenge to them could hope to achieve success. War is most likely when the power of the dissatisfied challenger and its allies begins to approximate the power of those who support the status quo.

It must be stressed that such a peace is not necessarily a peace with justice. Their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, dominant nations are interested primarily in their own welfare, not in that of the rest of the world, and the two are not always compatible. Nor is the challenger necessarily on the side of right. Challengers often claim to speak for all of oppressed humanity, but they, too, are primarily interested in their own welfare. Once a new international order is successfully established, the underdogs are likely to find that they are still underdogs who have merely exchanged one set of world leaders for another.

Peace is not synonymous with the maintenance of the status quo either. If there is one idea that we hope to put across, it is that change is constant. The international distribution of power is constantly shifting and with it many of the other arrangements that depend upon power. The possibilities of peaceful change should not be underestimated, but neither should the frequency with which major changes are brought about through war. As the challenger grows more powerful, it begins to demand new arrangements and changes in the international order that will give it a larger share of the benefits it desires. In theory, those who dominate the existing international order could make way for the newcomer and welcome it into the top ranks, giving up some of their privileges in the process. In practice, however, such action is rare. The challenger usually demands a place at the top and is rebuffed. Desiring change and unable to bring it about peacefully, the challenger all too often turns to war.

It might be expected that a wise challenger, growing in power through internal development, would wait to threaten the existing international order until it was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies, for surely it would seem foolish to attack while weaker than the enemy. If this expectation were correct, the risk of war would be greatest when the two opposing camps were almost exactly equal in power, and if war broke out before this point, it would take the form of a preventive war launched by the dominant nation to destroy a competitor before it became strong enough to upset the existing international order.

In fact, however, this is not what has happened in recent history. Germany, Italy, and Japan attacked the dominant nation and its allies long before they equaled them in power, and the attack was launched by the challengers, not by the dominant camp. If history repeats itself, the next world war will be started by the Soviet Union and/or China, and it will be launched before the challenger is as powerful as the United States and its allies, thus diminishing the chances of a Communist victory. However, history may not repeat itself, for the Soviet Union and China are not Germany and Japan, and there are other factors involved besides the relative power of the two camps.

OTHER FACTORS FAVORING WAR OR PEACE

We have established that world peace is guaranteed when the nations satisfied with the existing international order enjoy an unchallenged supremacy of power and that major wars are most likely when a dissatisfied challenger achieves an approximate balance of power with the

dominant nation. However, we have noted that in some cases (World Wars I and II) the challengers attacked before such a balance was reached, whereas in other cases (the transfer of power from Britain to the United States), the challenger passed the dominant nation without an armed conflict. Clearly, there are other factors at work. We have mentioned some of them in passing, but now the time has come to spell them out more carefully.

One factor influencing the likelihood of war is the power potential of the challenger when it begins its rise. All nations grow in power as they industrialize, and as they grow, seek a higher place in the international order. However, if a nation is too small to come anywhere near equaling the power of the dominant nation, even when it achieves full industrialization, friction between the two should not go beyond some minor problems of adjustment. The growing nation is too small to be an effective challenger. It will not become involved in a major war against the dominant nation unless it can team up with a real challenger of considerably greater strength. In short, there is no danger of war if the challenger is too small to be effective.

On the other hand, if the challenger is so large that its dominance, once it becomes industrial, is virtually guaranteed, the chances of conflict are also reduced. The future dominance of such a nation appears obvious and inevitable long before it is actually achieved, and this enables both the challenger and the dominant nation to adjust to the idea gradually. The challenger, for its part, need not attack the dominant nation openly but can surpass it in power through internal growth. The dominant nation, for its part, realizes that it will lose out whether it fights or not and so has a strong motive to avoid the costs of war and work out a peaceful adjustment instead. This factor undoubtedly played a role in the transfer of power from England to the United States, for by the time the growth of the United States was fully appreciated, England must have realized that she could not hope to compete successfully with the American giant. It may also play a role in the case of China. China's power today is very little, but her potential is obvious, and there is already considerable sentiment in Western Europe that we should adjust to allowing her a dominant role at least in the Far East. The risk of war, then, is also reduced if the challenger is so large that its future dominance is obvious to all.

It is between these two extremes that the factor of size may well be a source of trouble. If the size of the challenger is such that at its peak it will roughly equal the power of the dominant nation, the risk of war is great. Such a nation cannot hope to achieve obvious supremacy through internal development. It can secure a commanding position only by the voluntary surrender of the current dominant nation *or* by seizing it through

victory in war. The chances of voluntary surrender, always tenuous, are even slimmer here, for there is nothing inevitable about the rise of such a challenger. By standing firm, the dominant nation may hold off such a challenger indefinitely. The challenger, however, blocked from any hope of achieving the position it seeks through peaceful adjustment, may turn to war. This seems to be what happened in the case of Germany in World War I and in the case of the Axis nations in World War II. It may well be the case for Russia if there is a third world war.

A second factor influencing the likelihood of war is the speed with which the challenger rises in power. It should be clear by now that it is the difference in relative rates of growth that is primarily responsible for upsetting international tranquillity. The more rapidly the challenger acquires power, the greater will be the international repercussions of this acquisition. If the rise of the challenger is extremely rapid, it will be more difficult for the dominant nation to make whatever peaceful adjustments may be in order. Within the lifetime of a single generation of statesmen, the relative power of the nations they represent may change quite drastically. It is difficult for men of power to accept such changes and deal with them effectively. A rapid rise in power may also create difficulties for the challenger, who has a new role to learn. Statements and behavior acceptable from a nation of middle rank are often not appropriate for a great power with major responsibilities. Thus the challenger may find that its actions are more offensive to others than it intends them to be.

In addition, as we have noted, the rapid industrialization that lies behind a rapid rise in power may create internal strains of such magnitude that goverment officials are led to provocative statements and actions toward other nations in an effort to distract attention from internal difficulties and fix the responsibility for internal troubles on "the outside." Sacrifices may be demanded in the name of national defense that would never be tolerated for the sake of internal development alone. Thus a certain amount of international tension may be positively useful to a nation that is industrializing rapidly. The Korean War, for example, was probably a benefit to Communist China, for it helped create national unity at a time when the government was carrying out wide changes, many of which were unpopular. The trick is not to let such controlled tensions get out of hand to the point of provoking prematurely a major conflict that would surely destroy the hopes of the challenger.

A final danger is that too rapid a rise in power may go to the challenger's head. A major spurt in power within a single lifetime may lead officials to compare their nation not with other nations, but with its own recent past. They can *see* the difference between what their nation was and what it is today; carried away with justifiable pride, they may be led

to think that they have already reached what their nation will be tomorrow. Impatient at the reluctance of other nations to realize how powerful they have become, they may fool themselves into thinking they are more powerful than they are, and in the flush of overconfidence, deliberately start a major war that cooler analysis would clearly reveal they have no chance of winning. Both Italy and Japan seem to have suffered from such delusions in World War II. At present this seems to be a danger in the case of China.

A third factor influencing the likelihood of war is the flexibility of the dominant nation in adjusting to the changes required by the appearance of a new major nation. As we have noted, major concessions to a challenger are not always in order, particularly if the challenger is considerably weaker than the dominant nation. In the case of a challenger whose future dominance is assured, wise concessions made in advance may serve the double purpose of avoiding a world war and assuring the declining nation a higher place in the new international order than it would otherwise possess. England is the prime example of a nation that has retired from world leadership gracefully. She has applied this grace not only in her dealings with the United States, but also in her generous grant of independence to most of her colonies. France, on the other hand, represents a nation that has pursued an inflexible policy in dealing with shifts in the power of other nations. It is difficult to imagine which course the United States would adopt in such circumstances. A search for the determinants of flexibility of this sort would make an interesting study in itself. Suffice it to say here that the flexibility of the dominant nation does seem to be a factor in determining whether or not war occurs when a challenger rises in power.

Still another factor influencing the likelihood of war is the amount of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger. We have already noted that in the case of England and the United States, this factor seemed to be an important one in allowing the transfer of power to take place peacefully. Such friendship leads the challenger to be less offensive and less obvious as it passes the dominant nation in strength. One of the reasons America's rise to power did not antagonize the British was that it was not accompanied by a stream of anti-British statements emanating from the United States. America, at least overtly, did not *want* world leadership, and she expressed no desire to take Britain's place. Germany, on the other hand, was quite hostile to Britain and was thoroughly aware of her rivalry. Her desire to unseat England was constantly emphasized by the German government and by the press. The same is true of Russia and, to an even greater extent, of China. Hostility toward the United States is manifest and is reciprocated. Hardly a day passes without American leaders reminding the American people of the danger that the Soviet

Union and China represent, while Soviet and Chinese leaders constantly measure their countries' achievements in terms of how far behind the United States they are. Such statements do not in themselves cause wars, but they are both symptom and cause of the kind of attitude that makes wars possible.

Underlying this attitude of friendship or animosity is an even more important factor, and again it is one that we have mentioned before: whether the challenger accepts the existing international order and merely wishes to take over its leadership, or whether the challenger aspires to create a new international order of its own. Peaceful adjustment is possible in the case of the challenger who is willing to continue the existing international order and abide by its rules, but it is much more difficult, if not impossible, in the case of a challenger who wishes to destroy the existing order. England and the United States might conceivably have come to terms with the Kaiser's Germany, but they could not have come to terms with Hitler. England had no choice but to fight Hitler, even though her victory was by no means assured when she went to war. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the West could ever adjust peacefully to Communist dominance, for such adjustment would require greater changes than nations are willing to make voluntarily even though faced with possibly superior force.

Summary

Let us review the regularities that underlie the current instability of international politics. We have divided the history of international relations into three periods: the first period, now past, when no nation was industrial; the second period, from about 1750 until some time in the future, when some nations are preindustrial, some industrializing, and some fully industrial; and the third period, not yet begun, in which all nations will be industrially advanced.

The present or second period is the period of the power transition. It differs markedly from the period that preceded it and from the period that will follow; it has been characterized by great and sudden shifts in national power caused primarily by the differential spread of industrialization throughout the world. As each nation industrializes, it experiences an increase in wealth, in population, and in the efficiency of its governmental organization. Since these are the major determinants of national power, it also experiences an increase in power.

The power transition through which each nation passes can be divided into three stages: (1) the stage of potential power, in which the

nation is still preindustrial and possesses little power compared to any industrial nation; (2) the stage of transitional growth in power, during which the nation industrializes and experiences a great spurt in its power; and (3) the stage of power maturity, when the nation is fully industrial and when it continues to grow in wealth but declines in power in relation to that of other nations just entering stage 2.

The present period is also characterized by strong ties between nations binding them into competing international orders. Because of the importance of these ties, nations are *not* free without grave internal changes to shift from one international order to another.

These two characteristics—the shifts in power due to industrialization and the ties between nations—provide the basis for a recurring pattern that can be traced in recent international events. The most powerful nation in the world customarily heads an international order that includes other major nations (the powerful and satisfied) and also some minor nations and dependencies (the weak and satisfied and the weak and dissatisfied). As long as the satisfied nations enjoy a large preponderance of power over the rest of the world, peace is guaranteed. However, as new nations industrialize, the old leader is challenged. A recently industrialized nation may be dissatisfied with the existing international order because it rose too late to receive a proportionate share of the benefits, and it may succeed in drawing to its side lesser nations who are also dissatisfied because they are exploited by the nations that dominate the existing order.

Such a challenge usually results in war, although it is possible for world leadership to be transferred from one nation to another without a conflict. Certainly the major wars of recent history have all been wars involving the dominant nation and its allies against a challenger who has recently risen in power thanks to industrialization. In the recent past, such wars have occurred when the challenger had grown rapidly but *before* the challenger was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies, and the wars were started by the challenger. Whether this pattern will continue remains to be seen.

Thus wars are most likely when there is an approaching balance of power between the dominant nation and a major challenger. Other factors also operate to make war more or less likely. Specifically, war is most apt to occur: if the challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal the dominant nation in power; if the rise of the challenger is rapid; if the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies; if there is no tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the challenger; and if the challenger sets out to replace the existing international order with a competitive order of its own.

15

Diplomacy

We have considered the underlying forces that shape relations among nations in the present period of world history. We turn now to consideration of the process through which the official portion of these relations is carried on, diplomacy, and to consideration of the men who represent their nations in these relations, the diplomats.

It is customary to consider these men and their activities as very important, but if the analysis of the previous chapters is correct, the scene is set and the script largely written before the diplomats appear upon the stage. Can one really believe that it was Metternich, as ambassador to Paris, who was responsible for keeping France and Austria at peace? Can one believe that by taking a different stand, American diplomats could have prevented China from falling to the Communists? Is it possible that a knowledgeable and clever diplomat in New Delhi today could alter the policy of India toward the United States or the policy of the United States toward India? If so, one can believe that the proper diplomat in the proper place at the proper time saying the proper things can play a major role in international politics, that a good diplomat sets the stage and writes the lines as well as performing before an admiring public.

François-Poncet, the French ambassador to Germany and Italy in the years before World War II, once wrote: "In fact, I was chiefly an